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Introduction
The increasing role of Regional Government Organisations (RGOs) in the Asia-Pacific region, such
as Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and the East
Asia Summit (EAS), are widely considered a positive development, confirmation of the importance
of states in the region engaging in greater economic and diplomatic cooperation. A parallel develop-
ment amid the relatively strong economic growth of many countries of the region has been the in-
crease in defence expenditure enabled by developing economies, with the resulting desire by Asia-
Pacific states to project greater geostrategic influence. This has led to the present situation where
military spending in the region is now set to overtake that of Europe. A conventional arms race is
therefore already potentially under way in the Asia-Pacific, and rivalry over nuclear weapons also
exists among some states.1)
Geopolitics of the Asia-Pacific :





The major military powers of the Asia-Pacific have been increasing their military capacities in
recent times, threatening a 21st-century arms race amid rising regional tensions and overall
geostrategic rivalry. While numerous Regional Government Organizations (RGOs) have also be-
come more prominent in the Asia-Pacific, it remains a major diplomatic challenge whether these
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This paper will examine the overall nature and geostrategic trends that have recently emerged in
the region, comparing the relative military strengths of major states in the Asia-Pacific, and the main
security issues that motivate and concern them. The diplomatic role of the major RGOs of the re-
gion will then be assessed, considering whether they are proving capable of settling some of the ma-
jor diplomatic and security tensions of the Asia-Pacific, which are threatening to worsen.
In particular, territorial disputes between China and its neighbours, in the South and East China
Seas, are potential flashpoints for deterioration of relations, and even for possible armed conflict,
unless they are addressed successfully through the implementation of peaceful, effective diplomacy.
This is occurring amid a wider geostrategic backdrop of rising regional and possibly global he-
gemonic rivalry between China and USA.2) As one of the most important foreign policy concerns
moving into the 21st century, this issue can therefore also be seen as a case study to compare the
major competing schools of International Relations Theory : realism, versus its major rivals, liberal
and constructivist theory, with their differing views on whether military deterrence or multinational
institutions are the preferred means for delivering security and stability between countries.3)
Strategic Developments in the Asia Pacific
China
China is using its extraordinary economic growth to fund an increase in its strategic power, seen in
its increasing assertiveness on territorial issues, particularly in the South China Sea. China will nev-
ertheless remain well behind the US in its military capabilities far into the foreseeable future, par-
ticularly in maritime power projection capacity. This strategic fact has not prevented China from
taking a more confrontational approach towards its South China Sea neighbours in ASEAN, claim-
ing the entire maritime region, including the Spratly and Paracel Islands ; and with Japan, over the
Senkaku Islands (claimed as the Diaoyu Islands by China).4)
China’s official 2011 defence budget was US$89.8 billion. Its 2.285 million-strong active Peo-
ple’s Liberation Army (PLA) is organised in up to 12 armoured divisions, 38 infantry divisions, a
marine division, 7,400 Main Battle Tanks (MBT), 1,700 combat aircraft, 78 principle surface com-
batant warships, and 71 submarines, including 3 strategic ballistic-missile submarines (SSBNs) ;
China maintains a strategic arsenal of 470 nuclear-capable strategic missiles. While now far more
militarily powerful than its Southeast Asian neighbours, China’s military forces remain technologi-
cally behind those of South Korea, South Korea, and the USA.5) In a signal of its military moderni-
sation and expanding naval power projection capacity, China also launched its first aircraft carrier in
2012, with plans to acquire others in future, as the initial carrier is only suitable for training pur-
poses.6)
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The major outstanding potential strategic dispute concerning China since the Cold War has been
Taiwan remaining outside of its direct control. While tensions between mainland China and Taiwan
have receded in recent times, with increasing investment and personal contacts now being permitted,
Taiwan maintains its determination to maintain its autonomy, if not independence from China by
force if necessary, backed up by its military alliance with the USA. With a 2011 defence budget of
$9.9 billion, Taiwan maintains an active military force of 290,000 ; equivalents of up to 3 armoured
divisions and 10 infantry divisions (and a marine division), 1,420 tanks, 477 combat aircraft, 26
principle surface warships, and four tactical submarines.7) While these forces are well trained and
equipped, they remain inexperienced and far smaller in size compared to the overwhelming numeri-
cal advantage of China’s military.
North Korea
The other outstanding major strategic flashpoint of the region remaining from the Cold War is of
course the division of the Korean peninsula. Despite the authoritarian regime under new leader Kim
Jong Un providing some glimpses that it may be allowing more market forces to play a role in its
impoverished economy, North Korea remains intransigent as ever, when it comes to its foreign rela-
tions. Continuing its strategic weapons programme, which has been outlawed internationally by the
UN Security Council since it first tested nuclear weapons in 2006, North Korea was finally able to
carry out a successful ballistic missile test in December 2012, increasing concerns throughout the re-
gion, but especially among its neighbours South Korea and Japan, that it now has a wider potential
to aggressively deploy its small nuclear arsenal (of around possibly 10 to 12 warheads) in future.8)
Despite the country’s desperate impoverishment, North Korea also continues to maintain the fourth-
largest active military force in the world, of 1,190,000, comprising two armoured and nine infantry
corps ; with 3,500 main battle tanks, 64 short-range missiles, 603 combat aircraft, 3 frigates, 383
patrol boats, and 72 submarines.9)
South Korea
To counter its heavily armed neighbour, South Korea maintains its own extensive military forces, al-
though it is far more easily able to bear the cost, having developed one of the more successful in-
dustrialised and globalised developed economies. South Korea also has the advantage of its military
alliance with the USA, which includes the continuing deployment of US forces within the country.
South Korea’s active armed forces of 655,000 include two armoured divisions, 23 infantry divisions,
two marine divisions, and a Special Forces division ; 2,414 main battle tanks, 390 combat aircraft,
28 principle surface combatants and 23 submarines.10) There are also tensions with Japan, over
South Korea’s possession of the tiny Dokdo Islands, claimed as Takeshima by Japan ; however,
while this had led to a recent increase in diplomatic tensions, it is extremely unlikely this dispute
would ever deteriorate into an armed conflict, particularly as the US is concerned that its two impor-
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tant Northeast Asian allies remain on stable strategic terms with each other.
Japan
The return of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) to office following elections in December 2012
have raised the prospects of Japan altering Article 9 of its Constitution, reconstituting its Self De-
fence Forces (SDF) into ‘National Defence Forces’, which would have greater authorisation for
wider use of force, in order to participate in acts of ‘collective self-defence’ with its allies, princi-
pally the US. The new LDP government under PM Shinzo Abe is unlikely to attempt any such con-
stitutional changes until after Upper House elections due in July 2013, but there are already indica-
tions that defence spending will be increased, following on from the 2010 National Defence Pro-
gramme Guidelines instigated by the previous Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) government.11)
The main security challenge for Japan has turned out to be asserting its control of the Senkaku Is-
lands, also claimed by China and Taiwan.12) While nationalist politicians and activist groups have
been greatly responsible for escalating tensions with China over the islands, China has taken the op-
portunity to make near-continuous incursions by paramilitary maritime security vessels, and now air-
craft, into Japanese-claimed territory around the Senkakus. Anti-Japanese riots and attacks on
Japanese-linked businesses were also tolerated by Chinese authorities in September 2012, resulting
in a significant loss of trade between Japan and China.13) While it would be in neither countries’ in-
terests (as well as that of regional and global stability) to allow this dispute to escalate into armed
conflict, it remains a highly dangerous source of potential diplomatic tension, as both sides have in-
vested both international prestige and appealed to domestic nationalistic support in this ongoing cri-
sis.14)
To buttress support for its territorial claims, Japan maintains one of the most technologically ad-
vanced, highly trained and well-equipped conventional armed forces in the region, despite being
limited to a shorter-range ‘self-defence’ doctrine. However, this has the scope to expand into a
wider range of military operations, if the SDF reforms are carried out as planned by the LDP gov-
ernment. The wider use of the SDF has already been implemented to some extent in recent times,
with deployments in UN peacekeeping operations, and largely logistical support for US forces in
both Afghanistan and Iraq. Maritime forces have also been deployed as part of the multinational
anti-piracy task force in the Indian Ocean, with an SDF support base established in Djibouti, the
first such base established by Japan since the postwar period.15) The SDF’s military assets include
almost 248,000 personnel, including : 1 armoured division, 10 infantry divisions, one airborne divi-
sion, 806 main battle tanks, 371 combat aircraft, 48 principle surface warships (including 2 helicop-
ter carriers), 18 submarines, and 386 Coast Guard patrol craft.16)
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Following the dissolution of the USSR after the Cold War, Russia went into a period of strategic
decline. However, it has recently recovered some degree of economic and military strength, largely
based on development of energy resource commodities, particularly oil and LPG, as well as other
valuable mineral resources. Under the increasingly autocratic leadership of President Vladimir Putin,
Russia has been engaged in its own ‘pivot’ towards its Far East Region facing the Pacific, seen in
its hosting of the last 2012 APEC meeting in Vladivostok.17) The major power projection capacity
for Russia in the Far East is its Pacific Fleet and Eastern Military District, which includes : 17 prin-
ciple surface warships, 21 submarines (including 3 ballistic missile submarines), 23 patrol vessels ;
the equivalent of : a tank brigade, 4 infantry divisions, an airborne/special forces division, a naval
infantry brigade and regiment ; and 334 strike/fighter aircraft.18)
India
With a high rate of economic growth second only to China among the emerging powers, India is
also aiming to develop its geostrategic power. This is partially to counter China, with whom India
has territorial disputes, over which a brief border war was fought in 1962. India is also concerned
about any potential increase in China’s naval capabilities, which may challenge India’s maritime ca-
pabilities in the Indian Ocean, particularly if China is able to further develop port visitation and lo-
gistics access and intelligence gathering capabilities in neighbouring Pakistan, Myanmar and Sri
Lanka. India is also more directly confronted by its ongoing main security rivalry with Pakistan,
with both countries developing their nuclear capabilities since 1998, aimed at deterring each other.
India also has to cope with long-running violence and low-intensity conflicts in Kashmir, Assam,
and the extensive ‘Naxalite’ Maoist-based insurgency in central and eastern India.19)
To meet this range of security challenges, India maintains the third-largest active military in the
world, of 1,325,000, which includes the equivalent of : six armoured divisions, 24 infantry divi-
sions, 13 mountain divisions, one airborne/special forces/marine division, 3,233 main battle tanks,
798 combat aircraft, 21 principle surface warships, including an aircraft carrier, 15 submarines, and
54 nuclear-capable strategic missiles.20)
Major ASEAN States
ASEAN was founded in 1967 to counter the rise of Communism in the region, at the height of the
Cold War, and to secure peaceful relations within the region, which it has largely accomplished.
With the increase in the strategic influence of China, particularly in its claims over the South China
Sea, several ASEAN states have been engaging in the own modernisation of their military forces,
particularly in naval and air capacity, with recent average economic growth rates of 7% allowing av-
????????????????????????????????????????????
???Robert D. Kaplan, The Revenge of Geography : What the Map Tells Us About Coming Conflicts and the Battle
Against Fate, (New York : Random House, 2012), pp.178−179.
???The total active strength of the Russian military is 956,000, including 292 ICBMs. IISS, The Military Balance, pp.192,
200−201.
???Kaplan, The Revenge of Geography, pp.249−251.
???Pakistan’s active military is 642,000, including 64 strategic nuclear missiles ; as well as confronting India, Pakistan
has had to deal with an increasingly violent insurgency and terrorist campaign by the Pakistani Taliban. IISS, The Mili-
tary Balance, pp.243−245, 272.
Craig MARK?Geopolitics of the Asia-Pacific
? ?? ?
erage defence spending increases of around 4%.21) While this is principally aimed to deter the grow-
ing power of China, this increase in defence spending also has domestic security purposes for a
number of countries as well.
Indonesia’s military remains dominated by the army, which continues to fight an insurgency in
West Papua, amid accusations of human rights abuses ; Indonesia has active armed forces of
302,000, which include the equivalents of 7 infantry divisions ; an airborne/Special Forces division,
a marine division, 69 combat aircraft, 11 principle surface warships, and 69 patrol vessels.22) Malay-
sia’s active armed forces of 109,000 are relatively well modernised and equipped, with the equiva-
lent of two armoured divisions, three infantry divisions, a special forces/airborne division, 48 main
battle tanks, 67 combat aircraft, 10 principle surface warships, 2 submarines, and 258 patrol craft.23)
Singapore has the best equipped armed forces in ASEAN, with an active strength of 72,500, includ-
ing the equivalent of 5 combined-arms divisions, with 96 main battle tanks, 148 combat aircraft, 6
principle surface warships, 5 submarines, and 35 patrol craft.24)
The Philippines’ active armed forces of 125,000 have traditionally had to cope with various insur-
gencies, of the Communist New Peoples’ Army (NPA), and the Islamist Moro Islamic Liberation
Front (MILF), with whom a ceasefire has just been secured, and the Islamist Abu Sayyaf terrorist
group. The Philippines is also seeking to increase its maritime capacity, after the shock of China
sending military forces to secure the Scarborough Shoals island group in the South China Sea in
2011, which is claimed by the Philippines. The Philippines armed forces include 11 light infantry
divisions, a Special Forces division, a marine division, 24 combat aircraft, one frigate, and 63 patrol
craft.25)
Having fought a border war with China in 1979, and naval clashes over the Spratly Islands in
1988, Vietnam sees China as its greatest threat, and has similarly sought to recently improve its
maritime capacity. Vietnam’s experienced active armed forces of 482,000 include the equivalent of
3 armoured divisions, 66 infantry divisions, 15 combat engineer divisions, 2 marine divisions, 1,315
main battle tanks, 235 combat aircraft, 2 frigates, 2 submarines (with plans to procure 6 more from
Russia), and 62 patrol vessels.26)
Thailand has no major dispute with China, but is still aligned with the USA, particularly to gain
support for its southern counterinsurgency campaign against Islamic militants, which has been criti-
cised for human rights abuses ; the long-running role of the military in Thai politics has also re-
mained controversial in recent times, seen in its coup of 2006, and suppression of ‘Red-shirt’ protes-
tors in the 2010 political crisis. The active strength of the Thai military is 305,860, comprising two
armoured divisions, seven infantry divisions, two Special Forces divisions, a marine division ; 283
main battle tanks ; 202 combat aircraft, 10 principle surface warships, including an aircraft carrier,
and 83 patrol vessels.27)











counterinsurgency campaigns against ethnic-based rebel groups since independence in 1948, making
these the longest-running wars in the world. The military-dominated government has recently moved
towards greater political openness over the past couple of years though, freeing political prisoners,
including Noble Laureate Aung San Suu Kyi, allowing greater press freedoms and participation of
opposition groups in elections. These developments have been rewarded with greater diplomatic rec-
ognition, and much-desired foreign investment, enabling Burma (officially called Myanmar) to be-
come less dependent on Chinese investment, with a related reduction in Chinese geostrategic influ-
ence. However, concerns over human rights abuses against minority groups remain, with the ongo-
ing military campaign against the Kachin rebel group recently including airstrikes.28) The armed
forces of Burma will no doubt seek to exploit the desired increase in foreign investment to promote
its own business interests, as well as its military strength, which currently comprises active numbers
of 406,000, including equivalents of 3 armoured divisions, 58 infantry divisions, 160 main battle
tanks, 136 combat aircraft, one frigate, and 99 patrol vessels.29)
Australia
As one of the USA’s longest military allies in the region, Australia has continued to support US
military operations beyond the Cold War, contributing forces to the US-led wars in Iraq and Af-
ghanistan. The Australian Defence Forces (ADF) have also sought to have their capabilities up-
graded in the 2009 Defence White Paper issued by the Rudd Labor Government, which aimed for
an ambitious expansion of air and naval capabilities in particular ; however, recent budget con-
straints have seen this plan for expansion downgraded somewhat, with plans to acquire the troubled
F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, and up to 12 conventional submarines likely to be delayed in a follow-up
White Paper due in 2013.30) The ADF still nevertheless maintains a highly professional, well-trained
and capable active strength of around 56,550, including the equivalent of an armoured brigade, an
infantry division, and a Special Forces brigade, with 59 main battle tanks, 142 combat aircraft, 12
principle surface warships, six submarines, and 24 patrol vessels.31)
In one of the most significant regional defence policy decisions in recent times, it was announced
during President Barack Obama’s first visit to Australia in December 2011 that US military forces
would be hosted in northern Australia, based around Darwin, in a series of escalating rotations and
military exercises, which commenced in 2012.32) While aimed at reinforcing the traditional ANZUS
alliance with the USA, this move has generated significant anxiety within China, and highlights the
core diplomatic dilemma for Australia into the 21st century, of maintaining good relations with its
most important trading partner China, while simultaneously supporting its core security partnership
with the USA.33)
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The USA
Despite the recent economic difficulties the US economy has faced since the Global Financial Crisis
of 2008, which has led to cuts to its defence budget, and the strains endured by the US military
from its long wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the US retains the most powerful military in the world,
a situation which is unlikely to change for the foreseeable future. In the Pacific, the US certainly
maintains a position of unrivalled relative dominance, despite the increase in capabilities of China
and other states. The recent policy of the ‘pivot’ of US forces towards the Pacific, announced by
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in November 2011, will only seek to preserve this dominance,
where around 60% of US maritime capability will be allocated to the Pacific, altering the overall
general policy of having a ‘50−50’ deployment shared between the Atlantic and Pacific Com-
mands.34)
This is recognition by the Obama administration of the increasing importance of the Asia-Pacific
region to the global economy and international strategic stability in the post-Cold War era. In re-
sponse, the US has been effectively expanding its regional network of alliances, including develop-
ing closer relations with India, and also with its former bitter Cold War enemy Vietnam. This level
of defence cooperation by the US has also been increasing with other states in the Southeast Asia,
including Indonesia, Thailand, Singapore and the Philippines, ranging from joint training exercises,
to logistics cooperation and counterterrorism/security operations. The core of US foreign policy in
the Pacific remains its key military alliances, with Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Australia. The
US has insisted that the Pivot is not a Cold-War style containment of China ; however, there is still
a potential danger that tensions between the two regional hegemons could still yet escalate in fu-
ture.35)
The USA’s Pacific Command maintains the strongest military forces in the region, which in-
cludes : the 3rd Fleet, with 4 aircraft carriers, 42 other principle surface warships, 38 submarines (in-
cluding 8 ballistic nuclear missile submarines), and the 7th Fleet, based in Japan, with an aircraft car-
rier and 9 principle surface warships ; 8 air force wings, including 54 strike fighters based in Japan,
and 64 in South Korea ; a marine division based in Japan, an armoured brigade and infantry divi-
sion based in South Korea, and a marine division, an infantry division, and two Special Forces
groups, based in the US.36)
RGOs and Prosects for Asia-Pacific Security
The overall geostrategic situation just highlighted therefore demonstrates the imperative need for
constructing an effective multilateral institutional mechanism for addressing security issues in the
Asia-Pacific region. However, the current diplomatic structures are not proving to be very effective
so far. The most prominent of the regional government organisations (RGOs) which have emerged,
include : APEC, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and the East Asia Summit (EAS).
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APEC was established as a largely Australian diplomatic initiative in 1989, first at the ministerial
level, then as an annual leaders’ meeting from 1993, with overall aims of facilitating trade and in-
vestment in the region. While trade and economic issues remain the priority for APEC, ‘non-
traditional’ security issues, such as terrorism, piracy, organised crime, emergency relief for natural
disasters, and environmental degradation have also become part of its agenda. However, resolving
territorial disputes, and arms control, have so far effectively remained outside its remit.37)
The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)
The ARF, made up of the ASEAN states, plus most others from the Asia-Pacific, to a present total
of 27 members, is highly significant in that is encompasses such an extensive number of countries
throughout the region, ranging from the major powers to the smaller states, including traditionally
isolated diplomatic players such as North Korea.38) As the largest multilateral diplomatic forum of
the region, since its founding in 1994, it regularly raises issues of preventative diplomacy, consulta-
tion and confidence building measures. However, the limits of the ARF were demonstrated at its
most recent summit in Cambodia in July 2012, where for the first time, a final communique could
not be issued, as China refused to even discuss disputes over territorial issues in the South China
Sea. The US, Japan and ASEAN states had attempted to raise the prospect of a Code of Conduct
(COC) for the peaceful handling of territorial disputes in the region, but this was firmly blocked by
China’s intransigence over the matter.39)
The East Asia Summit (EAS)
The EAS was formed in 2005, as an extension of the ASEAN Plus Three (ASEAN?3) dialogue
process, with 16 regional members, significantly expanding with the inclusion of the USA and Rus-
sia in 2011.40) While similar to APEC, in that trade and economic issues such as energy are its main
focus, security issues, both within ASEAN and in the wider region have also become prominent ar-
eas for discussion. The last East Asia Summit of leaders (also held in Cambodia, in November
2012) again attempted to raise a Code of Conduct to prevent escalation of maritime disputes in the
region, but this was again stymied by China pressuring EAS host Cambodia not to have the South
China Sea issue ‘internationalised’.41)
Conclusions
Ideally, international law and multilateral institutions, both international and regional, provide the
best potential mechanisms for resolving conflict, according to the liberal and constructivist schools
of International Relations Theory. Other regions do provide potential models of varying effective-
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ness, such as NATO, the EU, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the
African Union (AU), and the Organization of American States (OAS). Regarding arms control,
Europe at least has diplomatic constraints on the possession and deployment of nuclear weapons,
through the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, and of conventional armed forces, with the
Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty.42) Such an arms control regime is sorely required for
the Asia-Pacific ; however, there has been little diplomatic effort or momentum towards similar
treaties being established in the region, certainly not through the various current RGO networks.
Further multilateral diplomatic initiatives do remain under way, principally to encourage greater
economic interdependence amongst the region ; principally the TPP and RCEP, which supporters
claim will assist in fostering greater interest towards peaceful conflict resolution overall, in order to
avoid endangering the mutual benefits of regional trade and investment.43) The recent leadership
transitions in Northeast Asia may also provide an opportunity to ‘reset’ foreign policy in the region ;
with Xi Jinping in China, Shinzo Abe in Japan, and Park Guen-hye in South Korea coming to
power, there is a chance for fresh diplomatic initiatives, which are already being potentially driven
by proposals for renewed trade negotiations between the three countries.44) However, there remains
little prospect for a similar level of cooperation on security issues. The current RGOs of the Asia-
Pacific have so far been unable to resolve the increasing territorial tensions in the South China and
East China Seas, nor the other potential flashpoints in the region, such as North Korea.
The challenge therefore remains whether the existing regional organisations can adapt to success-
fully address the security challenges of the region, or whether new institutions and diplomatic prac-
tices need to evolve. Another relatively new grouping is the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting
Plus (ADMM?), an annual meeting since 2010 of the defence Ministers from the EAS states.45) If
it gains further support and genuine participation from its contributors, with its direct focus on secu-
rity issues, it has the potential to possibly become the prime RGO for the diplomatic maintenance of
regional security for the Asia-Pacific.
If the dominance of power politics as recently seen in the ARF and other RGOs is replicated
though, the ADMM? could face the same fate of being another largely symbolic annual ritual on
the regional diplomatic calendar. The danger remains that the ‘realist’ paradigm of a ‘great power’
struggle for regional hegemony, driving a nuclear and conventional arms race, threatens to dominate
the diplomacy of the Asia-Pacific into the 21st century.46) Given the numerous potential flashpoints
which could possibly escalate into open armed conflict, the challenge for policymakers, political
leaders, diplomats, and interested commentators and scholars is starkly urgent ; to avert the foreign
policies of the region’s member states from descending into such a dire future.
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